The free world breathed a sigh of
relief at the end of the Cold War: we slayed the dragon of communism and peace
and democracy would reign. Yet to the
dismay of many, Russia refused to surrender to American hegemony, and today, US.-Russia relations are at the lowest point they
have been since the Cold War’s conclusion.
The war in eastern Ukraine between the U.S./Western-backed
Ukrainian government, and Russian-backed separatists has shown no signs of
slowing down, and around 5000 people have been killed since the crisis began in
February 2014. While the United States
has already committed $118 million in assistance to Ukraine, recently many
American politicians have suggested escalating the proxy war by arming the Ukrainian defense with lethal weapons and committing $1 billion in additional
defense funding.
Although all sides are to blame for how the crisis in Ukraine has played out,
the European Union’s reckless ultimatum that the divided Ukraine choose between
an association and trade deal with the EU, or an economic package offered by
Russia, ignited the initial crisis and ousting of former Ukrainian President
Yanukovych. This kind of Euro-Atlantic
vs. Russia, “us-or-them” tug-of-war we have imposed in numerous instances is
not only unfairly over-simplistic for culturally and historically complex
nations, but it has irreversibly aggravated U.S.-Russia
relations. If the U.S. continues to destroy Russian alliances and isolate
Russia in Europe, it may lead to serious consequences in the long-term global
power structure.
The same imposed “us or them” binary in Ukraine requiring them to choose alignment with the Euro-Atlantic or Russia was seen in Georgia in 2008, yet the analog was not enough to prevent the United States from making the same mistake twice. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world saw the global power structure change from a bipolar to a unipolar world. Instead of treating the post-Cold War unipolar moment with careful diplomacy, the United States celebrated the victory of democracy and liberalism on top of the rubble remains in Russia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), perceived by Russia to be a Western security alliance created against them, steadily expanded eastward all the way up to Russia’s borders. As former states of the Soviet Union containing territories with large Russian-ethnic constituencies, Ukraine and Georgia are critical to Russia. More than any other post-Soviet states, they are Russia’s red lines. Yet even knowing that Georgia was going too far, the U.S. still encouraged NATO expansion into Georgia in 2008. Signaling Western-alignment and a security threat to Russia’s borders, Russia reacted with force, invading and seizing Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, drawing an analogous case to Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Even Sarah Palin predicted in 2008 that Russia would invade Ukraine, considering Russia’s invasion of Georgia that year. It should not be a surprise that Russia acted similarly in Ukraine in early 2014 as it did in Georgia in 2008. While there is no justification for Russia’s violation of nations’ territorial integrity, the United States is at fault for putting complex nations in destabilizing positions that require them to choose between the Euro-Atlantic and Russia.
Driving Ukraine to choose between alignment with the West or Russia reveals the U.S.’s ignorance to the historical, demographic, and cultural realities in Ukraine, and overlooking this has resulted in the U.S.’s mistreatment of the crisis. The first mistake the U.S. has made is oversimplifying Ukrainians as one people, all united in their support of change. The Euromaidan protests and ousting of President Yanukovych in early 2014 was led by Ukrainians coming largely from the western region of the country that seek a Ukraine culturally and politically distinct from Russia. Yet there is a visible division between these western Ukrainians, and Ukrainians in eastern regions who maintain spiritual, cultural, economic, and linguistic connections to Russia. Another mistake the U.S. has made is misunderstanding the identity and objectives of Ukrainians in the east. Especially at the beginning of the crisis, there was only a minority of “pro-Russian separatists.” In fact, the vast majority of Ukrainians in the east and south regions of the country have simply sought recognition of their Russian heritage as part of their identity. The final mistake of U.S. policy toward the crisis in Ukraine was propping up the political aspirations of one half of the nation, while alienating the other half. In fact, three-quarters of the population in Ukraine’s eastern cities viewed the ousting of Yanukovych as illegal. The U.S. was perceived as aiding the western Ukraine Euromaidan movement, with political officials even being recorded during critical negotiation stages discussing who they sought to replace the ousted President.
If this us-or-them ultimatum continues in other countries with split Euro-Atlantic accession aspirations and Russian historical and cultural affinities, such as countries in the Balkans, more conflict will erupt and isolate Russia in Europe. When asked if worsening EU-Russia relations could lead to tensions in the Balkans, Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama said that the situation in Ukraine should be like a wakeup call for Europe, and that they should be “far more strategic and tactical” in their approach than they were in Ukraine. Christian Danielsson, the European Commission Director General for Enlargement, responded that he does not see a contradiction for Balkan countries to have economic relations with both the EU and Russia. However, if they want to be apart of the EU they have to adopt the EU’s foreign policy stance. For countries with long-standing alliances with Russia, Danielsson reaffirms the problem that the EU and the U.S. continuously pose to divided countries. Countries with long-standing alliances with Russia are asked to forgo their traditional bilateral relations, and surrender to the EU foreign policy positions that may oppose Russia, even including imposing sanctions.
Serbia is an example of a country that has been prevented from pursuing a balancing act between the Euro-Atlantic and Russia. The economic benefits of EU accession are immensely appealing for the nation’s development, but Serbia has a historical and cultural affinity to Russia as a fellow Slavic, Orthodox nation, and they enjoy close political and economic ties. On Ukraine, for example, Serbia has attempted to remain neutral and abstained on a UN vote to reaffirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, head of the EU delegation to Serbia Michael Davenport expressed dissatisfaction with Serbia’s neutrality saying, “We want countries such as Serbia to back our stance on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. We also want all our partners to support our efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to this problem." The EU message is clear: if you are not with us, you are against us. Another source of friction is the South Stream Pipeline deal, which would export Russian gas through many countries in Eastern Europe including Serbia. The European Commission’s opposition to the project may jeopardize its completion, which would provide a number of jobs and economic benefits to Serbia. Russia, who would economically benefit from the deal as well, is furious. Attempts to remain neutral by Serbia and similar nations with divided loyalties often frustrate and fail to please both parties. Since EU accession is Serbia’s top priority due to economic and development benefits, they will likely concede to EU demands if they are forced. However, forcing nations like Serbia to forgo ties with Russia is harmful to the United States’ relationship with Russia, and will ultimately impact European stability.
This “us-or-them” binary we have constructed is justified in the media by the overwhelming consensus that vilify Putin and Russia as the ultimate enemy and menace of Europe. According to the mainstream media, countries like Ukraine and Serbia uniformly desire Western-alignment, while Russia is a force bullying them to remain in Russia’s backward sphere of influence. The United States and Europe are framed as the benign champions of freedom and democracy. Stephen Cohen sheds light on this issue in The Nation, explaining that the mainstream media’s adherence to traditional journalistic standards, featuring balance through opposing views, somehow gets thrown out the door when it comes to Russia. Indeed, the Kremlin has a number of repugnant policies and problems that deserve criticism, but the failure to historically examine the origins of these policies and problems fails to tell the whole story. Even the most left and centrist news sources like MSNBC, The New York Times, and the Washington Post engage in the Putin and Russia-bashing – Howard Dean even going on Real Time With Bill Maher declaring that “Vladimir Putin is a thug.” The Sochi Olympic Games were mocked in the New York Times for the “Soviet style dystopia” complexes they were held in, and news sources repeatedly sensualized the threat of terrorism on the games. The American media maintains a certain degree of moderate coverage toward other “enemy” nations of the U.S., perhaps even less deserving, but Putin’s Russia is the ultimate villain.
As a result of media and government rhetoric on Russia, perceived relations between the United States and Russia are at an all-time-low. In a 2015 Gallup poll, it was revealed that Americans see Russia as America’s greatest enemy in the world, over North Korea, China, and Iran. 18% of those polled named Russia as the U.S.’s top enemy, a figure twice as bad as in 2014, and six times as bad as in 2011. Russian opinion mirrors this perceived animosity. The number of Russians who see America as its top enemy has risen from 25 percent in 2008 to 73 percent in 2014.
Aggravating relations and alienating Russia in Europe will push Russia toward other alliances, the most threatening of which is their budding strategic partnership with China. Both countries are dissatisfied with the current world order, and both feel as though they have been unfairly treated by the U.S. and the West. China and Russia have already signed a thirty-year, $400 billion energy deal, and have a $100 billion trade goal set for 2015. The extent of their political partnership remains unclear, but as arguably the two most powerful states in the world after the United States, they could benefit tremendously from an alliance. And the nature of such an alliance would be definitively anti-U.S., anti-West. Yet at the same time, China and Russia have historically been competitors rather than partners and have little draw to one another other than their “axis of convenience,” against the United States. The future developments of a Sino-Russian alliance are contingent upon the actions of the U.S. In a Huffington Post article, Artyom Lukin argues that it is not so far-fetched to imagine that a strong Sino-Russian alliance has potential to bring about another world war. World war is a specific type of military conflict, “one which features a clash of two mighty coalitions led by great powers and possessing roughly comparable strategic resources." The Euro-Atlantic coalition has been around for decades, and the Sino-Russian coalition is the only imaginable alliance with the strength to challenge the status quo. If the United States continues in its policy of containment by arming Ukraine, imposing sanctions, expanding NATO, and isolating Russia, Russia will be tempted to form an alliance with China solely based on their mutual contempt for the U.S.
The United States must find a way to reset relations with Russia. We must discontinue policies that are guided by neo-conservative, Cold War-era competition. We must discontinue NATO expansion in nations on Russia’s borders and respect their national security. We must stop sabotaging Russia’s alliances by forcing culturally, politically, and historically complex nations into “them-or-us” ultimatums between the U.S. and Russia. Although competition between the United States and Russia will inevitably remain, the art of diplomacy requires finding a balance of power, and a creative foreign policy that strategically engages Russia is not too late to implement.
